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ABSTRACT
There is a large body of work that documents a strong, positive correlation between
education and measures of health, but little is known about the mechanisms by which education
might affect health. One possibility is that more educated individuals are more likely to adopt new
medical technologies. We investigate this theory by asking whether more educated people are more
likely to use newer drugs, while controlling for other individual characteristics, such as income and
insurance status. Using the 1997 MEPS, we find that more highly educated people are more likely
to use drugs more recently approved by the FDA. We find that education only matters for
individuals who repeatedly purchase drugs for a given condition, suggesting that the more educated
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The National Center for Health Statistics reported in 1998 that “the 
chronic disease death rate for men with a high school education or less 
was 2.3-2.5 times that for men with more than a high school education”. 
Similarly strong, positive correlations between education and different 
measures of health (while controlling for income, occupation and other 
individual characteristics) have been documented by a large number of 
studies (see Grossman and Kaestner, 1997 for a review). There is some 
evidence that education has a causal impact on health, i.e. that more 
education makes one healthier (Berger and Leigh 1988, Sander 1995, 
Leigh and Dhir 1997, Goldman and Lakdawalla 2001 and Lleras-Muney 
2001). Some studies even suggest that the health gap across education 
groups has been rising over the past 30 years (Feldman et al. 1989, Pappas 
et al. 1993, and Elo and Preston 1996). However, little is known about the 
many potential  causal mechanisms by which education might affect 
health.
1  
This paper explores one possibility: that more highly educated 
individuals are more likely to adopt new technologies, and that they are 
better at implementing those new technologies as well. In 1966, Nelson 
and Phelps suggested that “educated people make good innovators” and 
that “education is especially important to those functions requiring 
                                            
1 Goldman and Lakdwalla (2001) show that the more educated choose more patient-
oriented treatment and are better at using these treatments. This evidence supports 
Grossman’s 1972 “productive efficiency” hypothesis. Kenkel (1991) and Meara (2001) 
provide evidence that the more educated have more information and use that 
information better.  But the effect of education is not fully accounted for in these 
studies.   3
adaptation to change”. Using a panel of manufacturing industries in the 
U.S., Bartel and Lichtenberg (1986) showed that more educated 
individuals also had an advantage in implementing new technologies (i.e. 
in learning how to use those technologies more effectively), given 
adoption.  
But the relationship between education and medical technology has 
not been explored.
2 Since the medical field is one of the most active in 
terms of innovation,
3 it is important that we understand how these 
innovations are used by and diffused among consumers. If the more 
educated are better able to adopt new medical technologies, then the 
introduction of new technologies will generate a health gap across 
education categories, ceteris paribus. This gap could increase overtime if 
the rate of innovation increases (and if innovations benefit all individuals 
equally). Since these predictions are consistent with the stylized facts, 
this theory seems worthy of investigation. 
The challenge when looking at technological change consists in 
finding reasonable measures of innovation. Following Lichtenberg 
(2000a), we use the age of a drug, defined as the number of years since 
FDA approval, as a measure of innovation in medical technology. Given 
                                            
2 With the important exception of analyses of the effect of health information such as 
the effect of the Surgeon General’s report on smoking. 
3 The ratio of R&D expenditure to total expenditure is higher for health (3.6%) than it 
is for the economy as a whole (2.6%).  Moreover, pharmaceuticals—the focus of our 
analysis—is much more R&D-intensive than other health care expenditure.  (Sources: 
Science & Engineering Indicators, and Health, United States.)   4
that newer drugs embody advances in the medical field
4 and are more 
effective, then the more educated should be healthier as a result of their 
using newer drugs. The advantage of looking at prescription drugs then is 
that we can know the date of innovation for all drugs. Therefore this study 
goes beyond other studies of innovation adoption because it is not limited 
to a particular case study. 
The specific question we address in this paper is whether more 
educated people are more likely to use newer drugs, controlling for other 
individual characteristics, such as income and insurance status. A simple 
correlation between education and the age of drugs could be easily 
explained due to the fact that new drugs are more expensive, and the more 
educated have higher incomes and are more likely to be insured. We are 
not interested in such indirect effects of education. Rather, we are 
interested in the behavior of the more educated with respect to their 
health, conditional on income and insurance, since this is the correlation 
that most studies have documented. If we find that education affects 
health independent of income and insurance, the policy implications are 
very different than the case where education matters only because of 
income. 
We use the 1997 MEPS to answer our question. This is a highly 
detailed data set which contains information on individuals, their 
conditions, and the drugs they take. Even after controlling for many   
                                            
4 Lichtenberg (1996, 2001) has shown that newer drugs are of higher quality: they are 
more effective at reducing mortality, morbidity and total medical expenditures.   5
factors, we do indeed find that the more educated use drugs more recently 
approved by the FDA. We also find that education only matters for 
individuals that repeatedly purchase drugs for a given condition, 
suggesting that the more educated are better able to learn from 
experience. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses in 
greater detail many possible mechanisms through which education might 
affect health. Section II presents the data. Section III presents the basic 
results and a number of additional estimates. Section IV concludes. 
I-What is the mechanism by which education affects the age 
of the drugs taken? 
One reason why the more educated are more likely to adopt a new 
medical innovation is that they are better informed. According to a 1999 
National Science Foundation survey, 32% of those with more than a 
college degree declared they were both very interested and very well 
informed about new medical discoveries, whereas only 14% of those with 
less than a high school degree did.
5 
But differences in access to information alone are not the only 
reason why we might expect differences in medical technology adoption 
across education categories. Conditional on equal information, different 
subjective evaluations of the risk and benefits of new technologies should 
                                            
5 From Science and Engineering Indicators 2000, published by the National Science 
Foundation. The report can be found at the following website: 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind00/access/toc.htm   6
result in differential adoption. There is some evidence that the evaluation 
of new technologies differs by education levels. In 1999, 71% of those 
with a college degree or higher thought that the benefits of new 
technologies strongly outweigh the harmful results, whereas only 25% of 
those with less than a high school degree thought so.
6  The question of 
why such evaluation is different across education categories might be 
related to the understanding of science.  For example, the National 
Science Foundation estimates that 53% of those with more than a college 
degree understand the nature of scientific inquiry, whereas only 4% of 
those with less than a high school degree do.
7 This type of knowledge 
does not directly relate to any particular innovation but more generally 
helps individuals process information about all innovations better. 
Presumably this knowledge is acquired in school. 
Rosenzweig (1995) gives additional insights into why a relationship 
between education and technology exists.  Education not only improves 
the ability to understand information but it enhances the ability to learn 
from experience and observation. If the more educated are better at 
learning then education will make a difference in situations where 
learning is possible, such as in the case of chronic conditions. Lakdawalla 
and Goldman (2001) and Case et al. (2001) do indeed find that education 
                                            
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. The level of understanding of scientific inquiry was determined from answers 
to three questions. One question ask people if they understood scientific study and ask 
them to describe the methodology. Another question ask people if a controlled 
experiment was a better way to evaluate the impact of a treatment than other data and 
they were asked why. Finally the last set of questions assessed the individual’s 
understanding of probabilities.   7
matters more for chronic diseases. In the case of prescription drugs, one 
would expect that among consumers with chronic conditions, the more 
educated will be better at identifying the most effective (i.e. the newest) 
drugs.  
Another implication of the learning theory, is that the more 
complex a particular technology is (and therefore the higher the potential 
gains from learning), the higher the advantage of the more educated will 
be.  In other words, the benefits of new technologies could also be higher 
for the more educated (although note that there is evidence to the contrary 
in the case of drugs, see Lichtenberg and Virabhak, 2002). Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1989) provide an example by comparing success rates of 
different contraception methods for women with different levels of 
education: success rates are identical for all women for “easy” methods 
such as the pill, but the rhythm method is only effective for educated 
women.
8 Admittedly, new drugs may be easier to use—e.g. once a day 
rather than several times a day. So according to this argument differences 
between education groups should persist only for complex drug 
treatments. 
The previous section suggests that the main effect of education on 
drug adoption is related to differences in information, differences in 
perceptions of technological progress, differences in learning and in the 
potential gains that accrue to the more educated depending on the 
                                            
8 Goldman and Smith (2001) provide additional evidence that the more educated are 
more likely to adhere to treatments.   8
complexity of the innovation. There are several other mechanisms, more 
specifically related to the use of prescription drugs, that could lead us to 
find a positive relationship between education and the vintage (FDA 
approval year) of the drug consumed. 
One important issue is whether or not there is any choice at all with 
respect to drug choices or drug adoption. It is important to emphasize here 
that today, there are many different drugs available to treat the vast 
majority of conditions. Using the National Drug Data File (see data 
appendix for details), we calculate that the average number of drugs that 
are available to treat a condition is 4.74. Furthermore, the number of 
drugs available is larger for the more prevalent conditions. This statistic 
is calculated by looking at the condition that the FDA approved the drug 
for. In reality, drugs are taken to treat many more conditions than they 
were originally approved for. So if we calculate the same statistic using 
the MEPS, we find that on average there are 22 drugs used for a given 
condition!
9 The important point here is that there exists a choice of drug. 
A different question is whether the choice of prescription drug is 
made by the patient. One possibility is that doctor and patient jointly 
decide what drug is most appropriate to treat the condition if there is a 
choice among different drugs. Another hypothesis is that individuals have 
no choice with respect to the prescriptions they take—these are chosen 
entirely by their physician—but individuals do select their physicians. It 
                                            
9 Note that this average is weighted by prevalence and also reflects the larger variety 
of uses for which drugs are eventually prescribed.   9
is possible that the more educated select better doctors, who are better 
informed about new innovations or more willing to prescribe newer drugs. 
Alternatively, it is possible that individuals will switch doctors if they are 
not being prescribed the drugs that they want to consume.  
There is anecdotal evidence that suggests that all of the above 
occur. There is evidence that patient demand influences doctors’ 
prescribing behavior. In their 1989 study, Schwartz et al. found that 
“patient demand for drugs, whether for a specific preparation or for a 
prescription in general, was the most frequently cited motivation (46%) 
for nonscientific prescribing”.
10 On the consumer side, recent evidence on 
the effect of direct-to-consumer advertising suggests that consumers 
respond to such advertising and ask their doctors about the prescriptions 
advertised on television.
11 These studies suggest that patients can have an 
important influence on their doctors’ prescribing behavior. Also note that 
there is wide variation in the prescription behavior of doctors, and in the 
rate at which doctors start prescribing new drugs (see review by Bradley, 
1991). Another way to exercise choice consists in changing physicians. 
                                            
10 The study found that “physicians also frequently attributed their prescribing of 
these drugs to intentional use of placebo effect.” 
11 A recent study by the Kaiser Foundation analyzed prescription drug consumer 
behavior since the partial “ban” on direct-to-consumer advertising was lifted in 1997. 
It found that “Among the 30% of Americans who said they talked to their doctor about 
a medicine they saw advertised in the past, 44% say that the doctor gave them the 
prescription medicine they asked about”. The majority of those who did not consult 
their physician about the advertised drugs were not actually affected by the condition 
treated by the drug. This evidence is not uncontroversial however. The FDA reports 
that only 2% of people who visited a doctor in the last 3 months during which there 
was a conversation about a prescription drug did so because they “read or saw 
something” (e.g. an advertisement for a drug).  See question 17 of 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/dtctitle.htm. 
   10
Legal evidence documents that patients change doctors to obtain different 
prescriptions (See Temin, 1980) or that they obtain prescription medicine 
illegally (the most recent example being the use of Oxycontin
12).  
In a similar vein, perhaps the choice of drug is made by the 
insurance company or HMO.
13 Yet again it is possible that the more 
educated choose better health care insurance plans, with more choices 
among potential doctors and greater prescription drug coverage. Although 
health insurance is mostly provided through employers, in 1999, 47% of 
those employed declared that they had a choice of health care plans.
14 
Furthermore individuals can switch health insurance plans. In 1996-97 
however, only about 8% of those that changed health plans did so to 
obtain better services. This channel is therefore plausible but perhaps less 
likely. But among those that changed plans, the more educated did so at 
higher rates (see Cunningham and Kohn, 2000).  
A final possibility is that newer drugs are developed by 
pharmaceutical companies for the more educated because the more 
educated also are wealthier (although we control for income and wage). 
                                            
12 Meier, Barry, “Overdoses of Painkiller Are Linked to 282 Deaths” The New York 
Times October 28, 2001, Sunday. 
13 The work by Baker (2000), and Baker and Phibbs (2000) suggests in fact that the 
rate of technology adoption has been affected by managed care. But since the more 
educated appear to be more likely to belong to an HMO, and HMOs appear to adopt 
new technologies at a slower pace (Baker, 2000, and Baker and Phibbs, 2000), we are 
potentially underestimating the true effect of education. See Benjamini and Benjamini 
(1984). Using the 1996 MEPS, we find that the more educated are more likely to 
belong to an HMO : among those with insurance, 21% of men without a high school 
degree belong to an HMO, where as about 53% of those with a Ph. D. do (for women 
the difference is 29% against 58%). We thank Sherry Glied for providing this 
information: The data on HMO is not part of the MEPS public files so we could not 
calculate these numbers ourselves.   11
Note however that new drugs are developed for particular diseases. If 
pharmaceutical companies target diseases of the rich and educated, we 
would indeed observe a correlation between education and the age of the 
drug. But this correlation would disappear once we control for condition. 
II-Data 
  To analyze prescription drug consumption, we use the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for 1997.
15 The MEPS is an individual-
level survey containing information on demographic characteristics (such 
as age, sex, race, education, income, etc), insurance status, and drug use 
(including drug price, who paid for the drug, the condition for which the 
drug is taken, and how long the person has had the condition).
16 Since we 
are interested in the effect of completed years of schooling, we restricted 
the sample to individuals age 25 and above that used at least one 
prescription drug in 1997 and had no missing observations. 
The MEPS data were collected in modules. The information on 
prescription drugs is in a separate file from the person data and the 
condition data. Each individual can be potentially matched to several 
conditions and each condition can be matched to several prescriptions. In 
the final data, every prescription, including refills, constitutes an 
observation. Thus an individual will appear potentially several times in 
these data.  
                                                                                                                                  
14 From the Commonwealth Fund 1999 National Survey of Workers’ Health Insurance. 
See Duchon et al. (2000). 
15 The 1996 MEPS data is also available but in our conversation with the AHRQ they 
suggested that the prescription data for 1996 should not be used.   12
Data on drug approval dates come from several sources, but were 
mostly obtained by filing a freedom of information act request with the 
FDA (see Data Appendix). The FDA provided a list of all new drug 
approvals since 1938 (the year when the FDA came into existence). We 
determined from the FDA list the date at which the FDA first approved all 
of the approximately 2000 active ingredients contained in drugs consumed 
in 1997. For each medicine we calculated the age of the drug as the 
number of years prior to 1997 that the active ingredient(s) in the 
prescribed drug was first approved by the FDA. Although prescribed 
medicines can contain one or more active ingredients, more than ¾ of the 
drugs in our list are single-ingredient drugs. The average number of active 
ingredients per drug is 1.27. For medicines with multiple active 
ingredients we calculated the average age across all ingredients. 
  The reason why we use the year when the active ingredient was 
approved rather than the year when the drug was approved is that we 
consider the approval of active ingredients to be the most important 
innovation. The FDA also approves generic equivalents, and new dosage 
forms of already existing drugs. There is a very large difference between 
the number of drugs and innovation: today there are about 80,000 
different drugs, but only about 2000 different active ingredients.  
Graph 1 shows the number of active ingredients approved each year 
since the FDA’s inception. Note that many ingredients were first approved 
soon after the FDA was established. Most of the ingredients contained in 
                                                                                                                                  
16 See Appendix for details about the MEPS data we use.   13
these products had already been discovered and were being used prior to 
1938. Year of approval is not a good measure of the innovation date for 
the early years, but this phenomenon is not very important after 1943 
(approximately). Also note that we have some ingredients with an 
approval date of 1930. 1930 was an arbitrarily chosen date for drugs that 
existed prior to 1938 and never came to be approved by the FDA. The 
actual innovation date is unknown. 
We link MEPS data with data on drug age from the FDA using drug 
NDC codes, which uniquely identify all drugs available in the market. The 
summary statistics for the final data are presented in Table 1. These 
statistics are also presented for those with a high school degree or more, 
and for those with less than a high school degree.  
The average age of drugs in the sample is about 25 years. The mean 
is slightly higher for the less educated but not much. However these two 
groups are very different on a number of other dimensions: the less 
educated are also older, more likely to be single, to live in rural areas, to 
be poor, and to be in poor health (they are more likely to report in poor 
health, they have a higher number of hospital visits and they have higher 
total health care expenditures). The means comparisons preview our 
regression results: the difference in the age of the drug is affected by 
education but the effect is not large. 
Several important statistics are not presented in the Table. The 
minimum drug age in our data is –4. Although this might appear strange,   14
we do observe individuals consuming drugs in 1997 that were approved 
only in 2001.
17 There are 12,431 individuals in the data and 163,081 
prescription-level observations. So the average number of prescriptions 
per person is around 13. The average number of conditions per person is 
about 2.6. So individuals are consuming about 5 prescriptions per 
condition. This number might appear high at first but recall that it 
includes refills. It is not clear whether is appropriate to use refills but we 
note that the results presented below are very similar if we estimate all 
regressions using means at the person level.
18 We present prescription 
level results here since the prescription level data contains more 




We estimate the following model, which estimates whether education 
decreases the age of the drug taken, conditional on taking a drug: 
Agedci = β  Xi   + µ Pdci + α c + ε dci ,        (1) 
where Agedci is the average age (measured in years) of drug d taken by 
individual i for condition c; Xi are characteristics of the individual taking 
the drug, such as education, personal income and insurance status (these 
characteristics do not change across drugs for the same individual); Pdci is 
a set of prescription level variables such as the percentage of the total 
                                            
17 These individuals were maybe part of clinical trials.   15
amount paid by the individual for this drug; and α c is a set of 3-digit level 
condition dummies. In all the estimation we cluster the errors at the 
person level and we use the person weights provided by the survey.
19   
We control for detailed disease categories because innovation varies 
significantly across diseases. The theory suggests that the more educated 
will use newer technologies to treat the particular disease they are 
affected with. The latest drug for condition i might be years older than the 
latest drug for condition j. Since the distribution of diseases also varies 
across education, the results could be biased if we fail to control for 
condition. 
Table 2 presents the results. We find that one more year of 
education lowers the age of the drug by 0.16 years. This effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, but it is not very large given that 
the mean age of drugs in the data is 25 years. Also this effect is small 
when compared to other coefficients in the regression: for example, being 
white or having private insurance decreases the age of the drug by 1.6 
years. The economic magnitude is discussed further below. 
One important issue is that, as we discussed in the data description, 
the true age of the drug is censored for drugs that were approved prior to 
1943. We estimate a linear probability model where the dependent 
variable is whether or not the drug was approved after 1970, 1980 and 
1990 (columns 2, 3 and 4). As expected we find that the effect of 
                                                                                                                                  
18 Results available upon request. 
19 Our results are not very sensitive to the use of weights.   16
education is positive and significant for all three specifications. We also 
estimate the model using a Tobit specification to account for censoring
20 
(Column 5). In this specification, the effect of education is somewhat 
smaller but it is still negative and statistically significant.  
Finally, we address some issues concerning measurement of the age 
of drugs. When constructing the data for the age of the drugs, we made a 
series of imputations (see Data Appendix).  If this measurement error is 
random then it should not bias the regression coefficients at all. If it is 
not random then the sign of the bias depends on the form of the 
measurement error. We constructed a dummy variable equal to one if the 
age of the drug was imputed, and equal to zero if the age of the drug was 
known. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant 
suggesting most imputations we made were for older drugs. Including this 
variable in our regression (last column in Table 3) has no significant 
impact on the coefficient on education however.  
Although not reported in the table, we also estimated additional 
model to test the robustness of the results for different measures of drug 
vintage. Estimations that drop drugs for which drug age is imputed, use 
date of approval of the main new molecular entity (instead of the approval 
of the main active ingredient), or look only at priority drugs (the FDA has 
a different schedule for drugs it considers more innovative), yielded 
identical coefficients to those reported here. 
                                            
20 We censored the age at 54, under the assumption that, as discussed in the data 
description, the true innovation date is known after 1943.   17
2-The effect of income and insurance 
An important issue is whether we can distinguish the effect of 
education from that of income. Newer drugs are more expensive than 
older drugs (see Graph 2), and the more educated are also wealthier. 
Given that many individuals do not have insurance, a positive correlation 
between age of a given drug and education could solely reflect differences 
in income or borrowing constraints. All previous estimates controlled for 
insurance status and income. But of course measures of income are 
usually noisy, and insurance does not pay for all medical expenses. Also 
note that insurance requires co-payments to be made for each purchase, 
and the co-payment might be higher for newer drugs (since newer drugs 
are more expensive). Graphs 3 does indeed document that individuals pay 
more for newer drugs (except prior to FDA approval, so for ages –4 to -1).  
However the issue here is whether the less educated pay more out of 
pocket for newer drugs. Lichtenberg and Phillipson (2001) find that 
“drugs purchased under Medicaid [by low-income persons] are fairly 
representative of all US drug transactions, at least in terms of price.” This 
suggests that access to new (expensive) drugs by low-income (low 
education) individuals (at least those covered by Medicaid) may not be 
that limited. Graphs 4 and 5 show indeed that payments for prescription 
(either total payments or percentage paid by self) are not higher for the 
uneducated. Graphs 6 and 7 suggest an explanation: private insurance 
covers a much larger percentage of prescription drugs for the educated,   18
but on the other hand Medicaid pays a large percentage of prescriptions 
for the uneducated. 
To further investigate this issue, we estimate the model again using 
different specifications (table 3). Column 1 reproduces the basic results 
form Table 1. In column (2) we add the percentage of the prescription that 
the individual paid. The amount paid by the individual captures the 
marginal cost to the individual and is perhaps the more relevant measure 
(although it might be endogenous since people can move away from drugs 
not covered by insurance). This variable is positive and very significant: 
if the individual’s percentage payment increases by 10%, the age of the 
drug increases by 0.6. However note that the inclusion of this variable 
increases, rather than decreases, the coefficient on education.  
Next, we add the percentage of prescription drug expenditure that 
the individual (or his family) paid for out-of-pocket over the year. This 
variable captures the extent of prescription drug coverage that the person 
has. Its effect is positive and significant: if the fraction of drug 
expenditure borne by the individual increases by 10 percentage points, the 
age of the drugs they use increases by 0.25 years. But interestingly the 
inclusion of this variable has no impact on the coefficient of education.  
To fully account for the effects of insurance, we break down 
insurance further into several components. In column 4 we estimate 
models that include the percentage of total health expenditures paid over 
the year from several sources. We find (as suggested by Graphs 6 and 7)   19
that Medicaid coverage and private insurance result in newer drug 
purchases (although only the later is statistically significant). Again, the 
effect of education does not change much by adding these controls.  
Note that we assume that insurance can be taken as exogenous in 
these specifications, which need not be the case as we discussed in 
Section 2. However there is some evidence this is a plausible assumption 
for prescription drugs.
21 There is no evidence that we know of about 
whether income can be taken as exogenous in our specification. However, 
if we estimate our basic model and control only for gender, race, and age, 
we find that the effect of education is about –0.211 and significant. 
As a last attempt to control for access, we estimate a model 
including the number of physician visits in the year. Presumably 
prescription drugs are obtained after visiting a doctor. Those individuals 
that do not have good access to doctors (because they are poor or 
uninsured) would presumably not use prescription drugs.
22 The last 
column of Table 3 shows the results. The number of physician visits is 
insignificant and does not alter the coefficient of education. Note that this 
variable can also be thought of as a measure of the severity of the illness, 
an issue that we discuss below. 
                                            
21 For example, Lillard, Rogowski and Kigton (1999) conclude that insurance is 
exogenous in a model of the effect of drug coverage on drug use and out of pocket 
expenditures for drugs. Coulson et al. (1995) conclude that insurance decision is 
exogenous to the demand for drugs. 
22 And there would not be in our sample unless there are consuming refills, or they 
obtain the prescription after a hospital visit. We still believe that the number of visits 
to the doctor is a good measure of access among those that have some access.   20
It is worth commenting about how we think of the issue of drug 
prices. Although we observe the total amount of payments made for the 
prescription, which can be thought of as the price paid for the drug, we do 
not include it in our estimations
23 because the standard economic models 
suggest that the relevant price information consists of the quality adjusted 
relative price of the new drug (compared with other drugs for the same 
condition), which we don’t observe. Furthermore if all individuals faced 
identical price schedules then we could not estimate the effect of price 
using a cross section. But since there is price discrimination in the drugs 
market,
24 individuals do face different price schedules, which again we do 
not observe. However we do control for detailed insurance coverage, 
which is one of the reasons (in addition to location) why individuals face 
different relative prices for the same drugs. 
Finally, although we find that the effect of education remains even 
with detailed controls for income and insurance, one possible 
interpretation of our results is that education is capturing the effect of 
permanent income or wealth rather than the effect of education itself. This 
is possible since we only observe annual income, which is prone to 
measurement error and at best is only a measure of current income. We do 
not have data that allows us to construct permanent income measures. But 
                                            
23 We did estimate a model using total amount paid for prescription at the prescription 
level. The effect of education was unchanged in these estimations. Results available 
upon request. 
24 Different individuals pay different amounts for the same prescription drug 
depending on their insurance plans and the prices that particular pharmacies offer. 
Sorensen (2001) documents that “[prescription drug] prices vary widely across stores,   21
we note here that others have found that the effect of education on health 
does not disappear once permanent income or wealth is accounted for.
25 
3-controlling for severity 
It is reasonable to hypothesize that the more seriously ill have 
greater access to newer drugs. Our data, like previous research,
26 suggests  
that the less educated are more likely to be seriously ill (recall the 
discussion in the data description). Therefore we could be underestimating 
the effect of education. Note however that the inclusion of severity 
measures is not without problems since severity variables are possibly 
endogenous: those without access to newer drugs will become sicker. 
Nonetheless, we add several controls for severity.  
The results are in Table 4. First we include the number of times the 
person visited the hospital over the year. Then we include a dummy if the 
individual self reported to be in bad health and, finally, we add total 
health expenditures over the year. None of these measures is significant at 
the 5% level, nor does their inclusion affect the coefficient on education. 
Interestingly note that the effect of hospital is positive—consistent with 
                                                                                                                                  
and stores' price rankings are inconsistent across drugs (so the low-price pharmacy is 
different for one prescription vs. another)”. 
25 Meer et. all (2001) show using instrumental variables that the effect of wealth on 
health is not causal. In their regressions education (lack thereof) is always 
significant. Hurd et al. (2001) also show that for some health measures education as 
well as wealth appear to have causal impacts on health. Case et al (2001) find that 
parent’s education affects children’s health net of permanent income: for 
older kids mom's education is significant (not dad's) and for younger kids, dad's 
education is significant (not mom's).  (these results are not part of the current version 
of their paper but Anne Case kindly made them available to me). Although our 
outcome of interest is not health, this evidence is suggestive that the effect of 
education is not solely capturing the effect of permanent income or wealth.  
26 For example see review by Adler and Newman.   22
Lichtenberg (1996, 2001)—suggesting this variable may be endogenous 
(i.e. taking newer drugs reduces the probability of hospital admission).
27 
4-Variation across conditions in the effect of education 
Although our data do not allow us to test all the mechanisms by 
which education affects the age of the drug consumed, we can test one 
hypothesis, that education matters only or primarily where learning is 
possible, i.e. for chronic conditions. In the MEPS data, we do not have 
information about whether conditions are chronic or acute. And 
unfortunately information on how long the person has had the condition is 
missing for a large part of our sample. So we cannot simply categorize 
conditions into acute and chronic. We can however test the hypothesis in 
two ways. First, we can estimate separate regressions by condition to see 
whether the effect of education is larger for conditions that are usually 
classified as chronic. Alternatively, we look at whether the effect of 
education is larger for individuals who repeatedly purchase drugs for a 
given condition. 
We first estimate regressions separately by broad disease categories 
(Table 5). We find some evidence to support the learning hypothesis: the 
effect of education is negative and significant for chronic diseases such as 
diseases of the nervous system, mental disorders and cardiovascular 
diseases. The effect is positive and insignificant for several diseases that 
are generally acute such as all infectious diseases and disease of the 
                                            
27 The MEPS also contains information about when the individual first became sick, 
but we did not use it because it is missing for a large number of observations.   23
digestive and genitourinary system. However there are a couple of odd 
results: we find a positive effect for cancers, which are chronic diseases 
and we find a negative effect for respiratory diseases, several of which 
are acute. However we note that these categories are very broad and so 
this is not a clear test of the acute versus chronic condition effect. At the 
bottom of the table we re-estimate regressions for chronic diseases for 
which we have many observations at the three digit level. We confirm that 
the effect of education is negative for hypertension and chronic sinusitis, 
but again we find that the effect of education is positive (although small 
and insignificant) for diabetes and depression. 
To further investigate this hypothesis we look at whether the effect 
of education is larger for those people who repeatedly purchase drugs for 
a given condition. The MEPS contains information about the number of 
prescriptions that the individual reports to have taken over the year for 
each of his conditions. This is probably a good, but by no means perfect, 
indicator of whether the condition is chronic. If the more educated can 
learn better from experience, we should observe that the effect of 
education is larger for those who repeatedly purchase drugs for a given 
condition. First we estimate the results for three different groups: those 
that have only 1 prescription for the condition, those that have between 2 
and 6 prescriptions and those with 7 or more prescriptions for the 
condition. Note that the median number of prescriptions per condition is 
3. The results are presented in Table 6.     24
We find strong evidence to support our hypothesis. The effect of 
education is positive and insignificant for those with only one 
prescription for the condition, it becomes negative and significant for 
those with 2 to 6 prescriptions by condition and it increases to –0.269 for 
those who use more than 7 prescriptions. In the last column of Table 6 we 
re-estimate the model pooling all individual together and interacting 
education with the log of the number of prescriptions by condition.
28 
Again we find that the effect of education is larger for those who use 
many prescription. These results are consistent with the learning model.  
5-Effects of education for different demographic groups 
There are large differences in a variety of health outcomes between 
different demographic groups. We therefore re-estimate the model by race 
and gender in Table 7. The effect of education is negative for both 
genders, although the effect is larger and only statistically significant for 
males. We also find that the effect of education is large and significant 
for whites, and small and insignificant for blacks, but the sample is 
smaller for this last group. Both of these findings are consistent however 
with previous findings in the health literature, which suggest larger 
effects of education on health for whites and for males (for example see 
Elo and Preston, 1996 and Christenson and Johnson, 1995).  
6-Is the effect causal? 
                                            
28 We chose a log specification because the previous results suggest the effects are 
non-linear, but the results are very similar if we use a linear specification.   25
So far we have assumed that the measured effects of education 
reflect the fact that the more educated use newer drugs, i.e. we have given 
the education effect a causal interpretation. This need not be the case.  
One possibility is that there is omitted variable bias. Perhaps 
education captures differences in unmeasured ability. In additional 
estimations not reported here, we added wages to capture differences in 
ability. They were never significant, nor did their inclusion affect the 
coefficient on education. But of course wages are only a proxy for ability.  
Perhaps there are also differences in discount rates: the more 
patient individuals invest more in education and health, with investment 
in health being captured by the use of newer drugs. Alternatively there 
could be some form of reverse causality: those that don’t use new drugs 
are sicker when growing up, and they obtain less education. Unfortunately 
no instruments are available,
29 so our results must be interpreted with 
caution. We note nonetheless that, as stated in the introduction, other 
studies provide evidence that there is a causal effect of education on 
health, consistent with our results.  
  
IV-Conclusions 
  This paper has shown a robust relationship between education and 
the age of drugs consumed. The MEPS data allowed us to control for a 
variety of detailed individual characteristics, the majority of which had no   26
impact on the estimated effect of education. The evidence presented in 
this paper does strongly suggest there is differential adoption by the more 
educated. Importantly, we also find that the effect of education is larger 
for individuals who repeatedly purchase drugs for a given condition. This 
result suggests that the more educated are better able to learn from 
experience. 
However, the effect of one more year of schooling on the age of the 
drug consumed is small. Nonetheless we note here that in the absence of 
Medicaid the relationship between education and drug age might be much 
larger. It is impossible for us to actually test this hypothesis but the 
evidence presented here certainly suggest that access to newer drugs by 
uneducated poor consumers might be much lower if Medicaid did not 
provide prescription drug coverage. 
How important is the effect of education on health because of use of 
newer innovations? This question is difficult to answer, in part because in 
order to evaluate the impact of new drugs on health one needs to know not 
only whether the more educated adopt first but also how much they 
benefit from new innovations. Evidence from Lichtenberg and Virabhak 
(2001) suggests that the less educated benefit more form new drugs. We 
find that they are also late adopter. Overall it is unclear what effect 
innovation might have on the health gap. Nonetheless we note here that 
ceteris paribus (i.e. if everyone benefits identically from new 
                                                                                                                                  
29 We investigated different possibilities with the MEPS, but we failed to find 
instruments that would satisfy the usual criteria. Results available upon request.     27
innovations), then differential adoption can only explain a small part of 
the education-health gap. We calculate that a ten-year increase in 
education decreases the average age of the drug taken by 1.6 years. Using 
results from Lichtenberg (2001b), we calculate that this decrease results 
in a life expectancy gain of .0475 years, or about 2.5 weeks. This is a 
very small gain from a large increase in education.  
Nonetheless, our results do suggest that the more educated use 
newer medical technologies, controlling for income and insurance. We 
have documented the effect in one area of medical innovation: drugs. 
Given that prescription drugs is a realm where individuals may have 
relatively little choice, it is quite possible that the effect of education is 
larger in other areas where choice is more important. Also note that 
although newer drugs are important innovations in terms of their effects 
of health, other innovations in the medical field in recent years may have 
had larger impacts on health (see  Fuchs and Sox, 2001). In these areas, 
therefore, the effect of education on health via technology adoption may 
be larger. Finally we believe these results are important in that they 
document that the more educated have fundamentally different behaviors 
with respect to health. This paper is a first step in understanding how 
education affects health. 
We note however a couple of caveats to our analysis. We cannot 
claim with confidence that our results represent causal estimates of the 
effect of education given that we do not have good instruments in our   28
data. But the results do suggest that unobservables may not be very 
important. Also, even with the detailed data available in the MEPS we 
cannot investigate all the possible mechanisms by which education affects 
the age of the drugs consumed. We find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that education matters for situations where learning is 
possible, such as for chronic diseases. On the other hand, we do not know 
if the educated have access to better information about new drugs, or if 
they perceive them to be more effective. Additionally there are other 
hypothesis we cannot test, such as whether the educated use drugs more 
effectively or whether they change doctors in order to obtain the 
prescriptions they want. Work in these directions would provide very 
useful insights about how education changes individual behaviors towards 
health and health production.  
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Data Appendix  
 
Data on drug approval 
Each drug used by individuals in the MEPS was assigned an age that was 
calculated using the FDA date of approval of the active ingredient(s). 
Most drugs are composed of a unique ingredient—for drugs that contain 
more than one ingredient we calculated the average year of approval.  
The FDA provided the date at which all active ingredients were approved. 
There were several ingredients in the data for which approval date was not 
available. Some dates were imputed as follows: 
-we imputed the date if the name of the ingredient was very similar to the 
name of another FDA active ingredient for which we have a date. We 
interpret the FDA lack of data on a similar ingredient as meaning that the 
FDA does not consider it a separate ingredient. For example, the FDA has 
an approval date for adenosine (1988) but provides no data for adenosine 
phosphate, adenosine 5 monophosphate, adenosine 5 triphosphate 
disodium, so we interpret that FDA considers all these the same compound 
(adenosine) and imputed a 1988 date for them. 
-Mosby (a private company) provided another list of FDA approval dates 
that was used to impute the dates that were still missing. We used this list 
to manually replace an additional 27 cases. 
-No attempt to impute missing dates for those ingredients that never 
appear in the prescribed medicine event, to this extent our data on 
approvals might not be yet as complete as possible. 
 
Data on drug approval year was matched to NDC codes by active 
ingredient. Multum Information Services provides data that matches drugs 
to active ingredients using the unique NDC drug code. This data are 
available from the internet at: http://www.multum.com. Then the data was 
matched to the prescribed medicine 1997 MEPS data by NDC code. 
   30
There were about 1500 cases that couldn’t be matched due to errors in the 
NDC codes in the prescribed medicine event file. We imputed the active 
ingredient (and therefore the approval date) for the majority of these 
cases using the name of the drug (the MEPS provides that name). 
 
Because of these imputations, we are concerned about the effect of 
measurement error. We therefore  created an additional variable "imputed" 





We use the following MEPS components for 1997: Person data file (HC-
020), prescription event data (HC-016A) and condition data (HC-018). 
The prescription and the condition data are merged using the linking files 
(HC-16IF1). We keep only those observations for which there is 
prescription and condition data.    31
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Prescription Level Data 
 
 All Ed<12   Ed>=12   
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
# of years since drug was 
approved 25.876 17.855  25.920  17.767  25.855  17.896 
Age 58.501 15.825  64.024  15.059  55.891  15.504 
Completed years of education  11.862 3.337  8.121  2.592  13.629  1.868 
Married (=1)  0.565  0.496  0.491  0.500  0.601  0.490 
White (=1)  0.851  0.356  0.809  0.393  0.870  0.336 
In urban area (MSA=1)  0.709  0.454  0.599  0.490  0.762  0.426 
Female (=1)  0.658  0.474  0.669  0.471  0.653  0.476 
Income 0-10K  0.433  0.496  0.671  0.470  0.321  0.467 
Income  10 - 20K  0.224  0.417  0.213  0.410  0.229  0.420 
Income  20 - 30K  0.127  0.333  0.069  0.253  0.155  0.362 
Income  30 - 40K  0.089  0.284  0.030  0.170  0.116  0.321 
Income  40 - 50K  0.047  0.211  0.008  0.089  0.065  0.246 
Income  50 - 60K  0.031  0.174  0.002  0.044  0.045  0.207 
Income  60 - 70K  0.016  0.124  0.003  0.051  0.022  0.146 
Income  70 - 80K  0.014  0.117  0.001  0.037  0.020  0.139 
Income  80 - 90K  0.005  0.074  0.002  0.040  0.007  0.085 
Income  90 - 100K  0.002  0.045  0.001  0.035  0.002  0.049 
Income 100 - 110K  0.004  0.062  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.075 
Income 110 - 120K  0.004  0.065  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.079 
Income 120 - 130K  0.001  0.026  0.000  0.010  0.001  0.031 
Income 130 - 140K  0.001  0.028  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.033 
Income 140 - 150K  0.001  0.031  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.038 
Income 150K +  0.001  0.038  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.047 
Has Private Insurance only (=1)  0.650  0.477  0.423  0.494  0.757  0.429 
Has Public Insurance only (=1)  0.298  0.457  0.516  0.500  0.194  0.396 
Approved after 1970  0.559  0.496  0.565  0.496  0.556  0.497 
Approved after 1980  0.438  0.496  0.447  0.497  0.434  0.496 
Approved after 1990  0.182  0.386  0.171  0.377  0.187  0.390 
Age of the drug imputed (=1)  0.122  0.327  0.106  0.308  0.130  0.336 
Number of physician visits in 
year  9.384 11.350 9.009  9.211 9.561  12.227 
% payment paid by self for 
prescription 0.585  0.424  0.607  0.444  0.574  0.414 
% prescriptions paid by 
self/family in year  0.522  0.350  0.554  0.373  0.507  0.338 
Total health care expenditures in 
year  7485.49 12337.86 8501.65 13969.12 7005.3 11455.53
Self reported bad health  0.155 0.362 0.250 0.433  0.111  0.314 
Number of hospital visits in year  0.372 1.059 0.424 0.988  0.347  1.091 










         
Sample: Individuals aged 25 and above. Data 1997 MEPS. N=163,081. 
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Table 2: Effect of education of the age of drug consumed 
Basic regressions 
Model OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  TOBIT  OLS 


















            
Education -0.158**  0.004**  0.003*  0.004**  -0.116**    -0.158** 
 (0.045)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (2.0e-04)  (0.045) 
Married  -0.568* 0.016* 0.018*  0.009  -0.114**  -0.568* 
  (0.250) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.250) 
White  -1.501** 0.032** 0.036**  0.015  -0.245**  -1.473** 
  (0.349) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.348) 
Urban  0.084 -0.004 -0.000  0.004  0.094**  0.088 
  (0.277) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.277) 
Female 0.306  -0.012  -0.014  0.003  3.440**  0.288 
  (0.269) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.268) 
Private insurance (=1)  -1.604** 0.037* 0.054**  0.043**  -1.845**  -1.600** 
  (0.513) (0.018) (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.514) 
Public Insurance (=1)  -0.615 0.015 0.033 0.040**  -1.137**  -0.597 
 (0.553)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.553) 
Age of the drug imputed (=1)            1.344** 
           (0.380) 
16 income category dummies  yes  yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
            
R-squared 0.27  0.27  0.26  0.14    0.27 
            
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. N = 163081. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and above with no missing values. Regressions 
include region of residence dummies, single years of age dummies and 3 digit level condition dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the person level.  
(a) dependent variable right censored at 54. A random effects tobit model would not converge, therefore the errors are not clustered here. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 3: Effect of education of the age of drug consumed 
Further control for insurance 
 
       
Dependent Variable: 






















         
Education -0.158**  -0.169** -0.161**  -0.167** -0.157**
  (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Married  -0.568* -0.499* -0.539* -0.534* -0.572* 
  (0.250) (0.249) (0.248) (0.254) (0.250) 
White  -1.501** -1.632** -1.553** -1.530** -1.492**
  (0.349) (0.350) (0.350) (0.346) (0.349) 
Urban  0.084 0.417 0.264 0.165 0.086 
  (0.277) (0.276) (0.276) (0.277) (0.277) 
Female  0.306 0.228 0.268 0.351 0.312 
  (0.269) (0.270) (0.269) (0.270) (0.269) 
Private insurance (=1)  -1.604** 0.661  -0.443    -1.589**
  (0.513)  (0.524)  (0.539)  (0.514) 
Public Insurance (=1)  -0.615 1.969** 0.633    -0.592 
  (0.553)  (0.567)  (0.579)  (0.554) 
% payment paid by self for prescription    5.990**       
    (0.278)     
% of payments paid by self for prescriptions in year      2.573**     
     (0.366)     
% paid by other sources is left out category       
% of medical expenditures paid by Medicaid        -0.309   
       (0.953)   
% of medical expenditures paid by Medicare        0.310   
       (0.997)   
% of medical expenditures paid by private insurance        -1.978*   
       (0.815)   
% of medical expenditures paid by self        -0.076   
       (0.885)   
# office-based physician visits          -0.005 
         (0.011) 
          
16 income category dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Condition dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
          
R-squared 0.27  0.29  0.27  0.27 0.27 
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. N = 163081. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and 
above with no missing values. Regressions include region of residence dummies, single years 
of age dummies and 3 digit level condition dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the person level.  
(a) N=163079 when including % price paid by self for prescription 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     39
Table 4: Effect of education of the age of drug consumed 
Person level results. Control for Severity 
Dependent variable:  










       
Education  -0.158**  -0.158** -0.158** -0.157** 
  (0.045)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Married  -0.568*  -0.564* -0.585* -0.565* 
  (0.250)  (0.250) (0.251) (0.251) 
White  -1.501**  -1.502** -1.503** -1.509** 
  (0.349)  (0.349) (0.352) (0.349) 
Urban  0.084  0.089 0.039 0.091 
  (0.277)  (0.277) (0.279) (0.277) 
Female  0.306  0.305 0.318 0.309 
  (0.269)  (0.269) (0.270) (0.268) 
Private insurance (=1)  -1.604**  -1.609** -1.606** -1.623** 
  (0.513)  (0.514) (0.512) (0.514) 
Public insurance (=1)  -0.615  -0.631 -0.632 -0.631 
  (0.553)  (0.553) (0.553) (0.555) 
Number of hospital visits in year   0.049     
   (0.170)     
Self reported bad health      0.176   
     (0.398)   
Total health care expenditures in 
year 
     0.000 
       (0.000) 
16  income  dummies  yes  yes yes yes 
R-squared  0.27  0.27 0.27 0.27 
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. N = 163081. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and above with no missing values. Regressions 
include region of residence dummies, single years of age dummies and 3 digit level condition dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the person level.  
(a) N=161,359 when including self reported bad health 
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Table 5:Effect of education of the age of drug consumed 
By disease categories 
 
   Beta
(a) s.e.  N  R-squared
 
By broad disease categories
(b) 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 0.097  (0.187) 2831  0.25 
Cancer (Neoplasms)  0.623  (0.383) 1457  0.36 
Endocrine, nutritional, metabolic and immunity disorders 0.014  (0.1)  22546  0.59 
Disease of blood and blood forming organs  1.319*  (0.671) 563  0.75 
Mental disorders  -0.115  (0.136) 10835  0.23 
Diseases or the nervous systems and sense organs  -0.688** (0.188) 8430  0.23 
Cardiovascular diseases  -0.183*  (0.086) 41645  0.13 
Respiratory system diseases  -0.283*  (0.122) 17433  0.08 
Digestive system  0.06  (0.138) 7532  0.37 
Diseases of the genitourinary system  0.02  (0.14) 6920  0.47 
All Other  -0.180*  (0.09) 42889  0.2 
        
For some common 3 digit ICD 9 diseases 
Hypertension (ICD9 code=401)  -0.161  (0.093) 25257  0.05 
Chronic sinusitis (ICD9 code=473)  -0.353  (0.222) 2147  0.12 
Diabetes (ICD9 code=250)  0.265  (0.158) 8129  0.13 
Depression (ICD9 code=311)  0.005  (0.188) 5512  0.16 
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and above with no missing values.  
(a) Each coefficient represents the effect of more more year of schooling and is obtained from separate regressions. Each regressions include 
all the controls used in previous tables. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the person level.  
 
(b) These broad categories were created by grouping icd9 codes at the two digit level as follows: as follows infection (13 and less), cancer 
(14-23) endocrine (24-27), blood (28-29), mental (29-31), nervous (32-38), cardiovascular (39-45), respiratory (46-51), digestive (52-57), 
urinary (58-62) and other (63 and above). In these regressions 3-digit condition dummies (within category) were included. 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             41
Table 6: Effect of education by extent of prescription drug use 
 



















with log (# 
prescriptions 
by condition)
          
Education -0.158**  0.042  -0.194***  -0.269**  0.021 
 (0.045)  (0.074)  (0.054)  (0.113)  (0.065) 
Education*log(number of 
prescriptions for conditions) 
       -0.160*** 
(0.053) 
         2.690*** 
log(number of prescriptions for 
conditions) 
       (0.684) 
          
N  163,081  24,626 108,767  29,688  163,081 
R-squared 0.27  027 0.33 0.19   
         
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and above with no missing values.  
Each coefficient represents the effect of more more year of schooling and is obtained from separate regressions. Each regressions include all 
the controls used in previous tables. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the person level.         
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Table 7 Effect of education of the age of drug consumed 
By groups 
Dependent variable: Age of drug in 
years 
All Males  Females  Whites  Non-Whites
 
          
Education -0.158**  -0.266**  -0.091  -0.170**  -0.018 
  (0.045)  (0.069) (0.053) (0.048)  (0.115) 
Married  -0.568* -0.913* -0.532 -0.610*  -0.931 
  (0.250)  (0.431) (0.291) (0.266)  (0.651) 
White  -1.501** -2.270**  -1.172**     
  (0.349) (0.609)  (0.388)     
Urban  0.084  0.096 0.051 0.175 -1.087 
  (0.277)  (0.431) (0.326) (0.292)  (0.706) 
Private insurance (=1)  0.306 -1.947*  -1.265  -1.686**  -1.635 
  (0.269)  (0.879) (0.652) (0.572)  (1.119) 
Public insurance (=1)  -1.604**  -0.175 -0.712 -0.880  -0.463 
  (0.513)  (0.960) (0.697) (0.627)  (1.164) 
Female -0.615      0.391  -1.335* 
  (0.553)     (0.284)  (0.661) 
16 income dummies  yes  yes yes yes  yes 
        
N 163,081  55,708 107,373  138,716  24,365 
R-squared 0.27  0.24 0.30 0.28  0.26 
Notes: Data: 1997 MEPS. N = 163081. Sample: All prescriptions for individuals aged 25 and above with no missing values. Regressions 
include region of residence dummies, single years of age dummies and 3 digit level condition dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the person level. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
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Average payment for Prescription by age of the drugs

































Average payment for prescription by self by age of the drugs


































































































































































Average % paid for prescriptions by Medicaid by education
years of schooling
0 17
1.55644
46.6375
 
 